This study examines the connections between the transatlantic security system and the international monetary system during the Cold War. The question of who would bear the enormous cost of British and American troops stationed in West Germany became a contentious issue that burdened relations between the Federal Republic and its major allies from the 1950s to the 1970s.

Washington and London saw this cost as a major reason for the decline of their currencies and therefore called on Germany to underwrite or "off-set" these expenses; and West Germany reluctantly agreed to trade money for security. By investigating the linkage between monetary and strategic policy this book demonstrates the crucial importance of domestic politics for the formulation of foreign policy and illuminates transatlantic history during the Cold War from a new angle.

1. On Whose Shoulders? German Rearmament and the Cold
War Burden
2. The British "Ner Look" and Anglo-German Relations
3. Adenauer and "Perfidious Albion": Troop Reductions, Support
Costs, and the Integration of Europe, 1957-1959
4. The Radford Plan: America and Its Troops in Germany,
1955-1958
5. The Political Economy of U.S. Troop Stationing in Europe
6. Offset and Monetary Policy During the Kennedy Administration
1961-1962
7. The Bargain Slowly Unravels: Troop Reductions, and the
Balance of Payments, 1962-1965
8. The Culmination of the Burden-Sharing Conflict: Chancellor
Erhard's Visit to Washington in September 1966
9. The Trilateral Negotiations of 1966-1967